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Abstract
Since the initial detection in 2003, Indonesia has reported 200 human cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 
(HPAI H5N1), associated with an exceptionally high case fatality rate (84%) compared to other geographical regions affected 
by other genetic clades of the virus. However, there is limited information on the genetic diversity of HPAI H5N1 viruses, 
especially those isolated from humans in Indonesia. In this study, the genetic and antigenic characteristics of 35 HPAI H5N1 
viruses isolated from humans were analyzed. Full genome sequences were analyzed for the presence of substitutions in the 
receptor binding site, and polymerase complex, as markers for virulence or human adaptation, as well as antiviral drug resist-
ance substitutions. Only a few substitutions associated with human adaptation were observed, a remarkably low prevalence 
of the human adaptive substitution PB2-E627K, which is common during human infection with other H5N1 clades and 
a known virulence marker for avian influenza viruses during human infections. In addition, the antigenic profile of these 
Indonesian HPAI H5N1 viruses was determined using serological analysis and antigenic cartography. Antigenic characteri-
zation showed two distinct antigenic clusters, as observed previously for avian isolates. These two antigenic clusters were 
not clearly associated with time of virus isolation. This study provides better insight in genetic diversity of H5N1 viruses 
during human infection and the presence of human adaptive markers. These findings highlight the importance of evaluating 
virus genetics for HPAI H5N1 viruses to estimate the risk to human health and the need for increased efforts to monitor the 
evolution of H5N1 viruses across Indonesia.
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Introduction
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) viruses are a 
global concern for both animal and human health [1]. HPAI 
H5N1 viruses of the A/goose/Guangdong/1/1996 lineage 
were first discovered in 1996 in China and since have con-
tinued to circulate in poultry and wild birds across Asia, the 
Middle East, Europe and Africa [2, 3]. In total, 68 countries 
have been affected and millions of birds have succumbed to 
the disease or have been culled to prevent further spread of 
the disease [4]. HPAI H5N1 viruses infect humans sporadi-
cally and may cause severe disease with a high case fatality 
rate among confirmed hospitalized patients. To date, there 
are 861 confirmed human cases, of which 455 have died 
[5]. HPAI H5N1 viruses continue to evolve through genetic 
drift and reassortment events with other avian influenza A 
viruses, resulting in multiple genetic clades and subtypes 
[6, 7].
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HPAI H5N1 viruses were first identified in Indone-
sia from poultry outbreaks on the Java Island in 2003 and 
had since spread to other parts of the country [8, 9]. Dur-
ing subsequent years, clade 2.1 viruses became enzootic 
in Indonesia [10]. However, a new HPAI H5N1 clade 2.3 
virus was detected during poultry outbreaks since 2012. 
200 human infections with HPAI H5N1 viruses have been 
reported in Indonesia so far with higher case fatality rates 
among reported cases (84%) compared to the rest of the 
world afflicted by the virus. We previously showed that high 
nasopharyngeal viral load was associated with more severe 
outcome of human H5N1 infections in Indonesia and that the 
virus was more commonly detected in blood relative to other 
geographical regions affected by HPAI H5N1 [11, 12]. Strik-
ingly, although the number of detections in humans peaked 
in 2005–2006 in Indonesia and subsequently declined in the 
following years, the case fatality rate in Indonesia increased 
over time from 65% in 2005 to 100% since 2012. This 
increase was associated with higher viral load prior to treat-
ment and the presence of mutations in the matrix protein that 
confers adamantane resistance [11]. However, reasons for 
the higher viral load and case fatality rate are still unclear. 
More detailed sequence analyses are warranted to investigate 
the presence of known virulence markers and substitutions 
related to possible human adaptation, which can help explain 
the higher viral loads and increased mortality.
In response to the outbreaks, the Indonesian govern-
ment implemented a strategy to reduce the incidence of 
HPAI H5N1 virus infections in poultry including stamp-
ing out of infected poultry, culling of contiguous flocks 
and poultry vaccination [13]. Several vaccines were devel-
oped and implemented to match the circulating strain in 
the poultry and pandemic preparedness over the time [14, 
15]. The initial vaccine used was based on the A/Chicken/
Legok/2003 isolate, a clade 2.1.1 virus [13, 16]. By 2010, 
the vaccine strain was updated to subclade 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 
viruses, based on isolates A/Chicken/West Java/30/07 and 
A/Chicken/Nagrak/30/07, respectively [17]. To date, a new 
subclade of H5N1 has emerged (2.3.2.1) and a new vaccine 
was developed based on isolate A/duck/Sukoharjo/BBVW-
1428-9/2012 [10]. However, as a consequence of the large-
scale vaccination, antigenic drift was induced in poultry and 
consequently the vaccines became less effective [18].
Despite vaccination efforts, the number of poultry out-
breaks remained high and the epidemic in poultry continued 
to spread among 32 out of 34 Indonesian provinces with 
over 11,000 reported poultry outbreaks since 2007 [19]. The 
large number of poultry outbreaks continues to pose a threat 
for future zoonotic infections in humans, antigenic drift and 
possible host adaptations that could increase the pandemic 
risk of circulating viruses [20, 21].
Improved insights into the genetic and antigenic charac-
teristics of HPAI H5N1 viruses from Indonesia provide a 
better understanding of its epidemiology, the high case fatal-
ity rate and for a pandemic risk assessment [22]. Sequenc-
ing data contain valuable information about viral genetic 
characteristics, including presence of known human adaptive 
markers, resistance against available antiviral drugs or other 
changes that can explain the high and rising mortality, while 
antigenic characterization will help assess the potential pro-
tection of pre-pandemic vaccines.
Here, we conducted a study to characterize the viral 
genetics of HPAI H5N1 viruses isolated from patients in 
Indonesia between 2008 and 2015 that could explain the 
virulence leading to the high case fatality rate. We inves-
tigated the presence of known molecular determinants of 
virulence, receptor binding properties and antiviral suscep-
tibility using whole genome sequencing of the HPAI H5N1 
viruses. In addition, we investigated the antigenic properties 
of these human virus isolates and compared them to previ-
ous antigenic changes in HPAI H5N1 viruses from poultry, 
in order to assess the usefulness of and protection by current 
available pre-pandemic virus vaccines.
Materials and methods
Specimen and data collection
As part of the national procedure for avian influenza case 
investigation in Indonesia, respiratory specimens were col-
lected from suspected H5N1 cases admitted to hospitals 
throughout Indonesia and sent to the national reference 
laboratory for influenza at the National Institute of Health 
Research and Development (NIHRD) in Jakarta. Suspected 
cases were defined according to World Health Organization 
(WHO) criteria [23]. The NIHRD is the reference labora-
tory under the Indonesian Ministry of Health responsible for 
laboratory testing and event-based surveillance of emerg-
ing infectious diseases in humans, including avian influenza 
A/H5N1 virus. Because Indonesian clinical specimens are 
obtained from suspected H5N1 cases as part of the national 
outbreak procedure for HPAI H5N1 case investigations, 
requirement for informed consent has been waived by the 
Indonesian Ministry of Health.
The specimens and data were collected from January 
2008 to December 2015, according to the national outbreak 
investigation protocol following circulation of HPAI H5N1 
viruses in South East Asia [24]. All of the specimens col-
lected were stored and analyzed at the NIHRD. Laboratory 
identification and confirmation was determined using real-
time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR) typing and subtyping assay according to the Centers 
for Disease Control (CDC) (Atlanta, United States) proto-
col [25]. Specimens for all laboratory-confirmed cases were 
selected for subsequent virus isolation and genetic analyses, 
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based on the specimen with the lowest cycle threshold (Ct) 
value according to the real-time RT-PCR, available for each 
patient.
Specimen isolation and characterization
The 71 selected specimens positive for influenza A(H5N1) 
virus with a Ct value below 35 were grown in 9- to 10-day-
old specific pathogen-free (SPF) embryonated chicken eggs 
in a Biosafety Level 3 (BSL3) facility [26]. After incubation 
at 37 °C for 30 h, the egg allantoic fluid was harvested and 
hemagglutination titers were determined by hemagglutina-
tion assay. A total of 35 positive cultures were obtained due 
to variable specimen quality and limited availability of spec-
imen volumes. The viral RNA was extracted from 200 µl 
of influenza virus positive allantoic fluids using High Pure 
RNA isolation kit (Roche) with on-column DNase treatment 
according to the manufacturer’s instructions. The RNA was 
reverse transcribed into cDNA using Uni12M primer (AGC 
RAA AGC AGG ) [27] using SuperScript III Reverse Tran-
scriptase (Invitrogen, Carlsbad, CA, USA) according to the 
manufacturer’s protocol. PCR amplification was performed 
using gene specific whole genome degenerative primer sets 
(primer sequences available upon request) [28–30] using 
Platinum Taq DNA Polymerase High Fidelity (Invitrogen). 
The PCR products were then purified with the ExoSAP-IT 
purification kit (Affimetrix, Inc, Santa Clara, CA) according 
to the manufacturer’s protocol.
The complete coding sequences were sequenced using the 
Big Dye Terminator v3.1 cycle sequencing kit (Applied Bio-
system, Foster City, CA, USA). The products of the sequenc-
ing reactions were cleaned using Big Dye X Terminator Kit 
(Applied Biosystem, Foster City, CA, USA) according to 
manufacturer’s instructions and sequenced in a 16-capillary 
3130xl Genetic Analyzer (Applied Biosystem, Foster City, 
CA, USA).
All nucleotide sequences obtained from this study have 
been deposited in the GISAID database (see Supplemental 
Table S2).
Phylogenetic analyses
The assembly and editing process of sequences from all 
eight gene segments was performed using Codon Code 
software (Gene Codes, USA). All sequences were aligned 
using ClustalW as available within BioEdit software ver-
sion 7.0.8.0 [31]. To infer the evolutionary relationships 
between the viruses, maximum likelihood (ML) phyloge-
netic trees were constructed using RAxML 8.2.12 with the 
GTRGAMMA nucleotide substitution model [32, 33]. A 
ML phylogenetic tree was constructed using the combined 
nucleotide alignment of hemagglutinin (HA) sequences from 
the newly sampled viruses and reference sequences used to 
defined the H5 nomenclature system (https ://www.who.int/
influ enza/gisrs _labor atory /20110 1_h5sma lltre ealig nment 
.txt; Fig. 1) [34, 35]. Sequence data of human and avian 
H5N1 viruses from Indonesia with all eight influenza virus 
gene segments (200 viral isolates as of January 2020) was 
downloaded from the (GISAID) EpiFlu Database [36]. Indi-
vidual ML trees were reconstructed for each gene segment to 
compare the genetic diversity of the newly sampled viruses 
against those previously collected from Indonesia (Fig. S1). 
Tanglegrams were visualized using the Baltic toolkit (https 
://githu b.com/evogy tis/balti c).
Residue and molecular analysis
Amino acid sequences were analyzed to identify substitu-
tions potentially linked to human adaptation, virulence, 
antiviral resistance and antigenic properties as listed in the 
CDC H5N1 Genetic Change Inventory [37]. In addition to 
this inventory, we also used FluSurver to identify potentially 
relevant substitutions present in our sequence dataset (https 
://www.gisai d.org, https ://flusu rver.bii.a-star.edu.sg). Flu-
Surver is a web-based tool to rapidly screen the sequences 
for potential mutations based on the curated and published 
literature.
Antigenic assays
Virus titers were determined by hemagglutination assay and 
antigenic characterization was performed by hemagglutina-
tion inhibition (HI) assays according to WHO protocols [38, 
39]. The ferret antisera specifically reactive to defined H5 
hemagglutinin clades were raised as described previously 
[40]. All antisera were pretreated overnight at 37 °C with 
receptor destroying enzyme (RDE Vibrio cholerae neurami-
nidase), followed by inactivation for 1 h at 56 °C. The HI 
assays were performed using the following procedures: two-
fold serial dilutions of 50 µl antisera starting at a 1:20 were 
mixed with 25 µl of a virus containing 4 hemagglutinating 
units (HAU) and were incubated at 37 °C for 30 min. Then, 
25 µl of 1% turkey erythrocytes was added and incubated 
at 4 °C for 1 h. The HI titer is determined as the reciprocal 
value of the highest serum dilution that completely inhibited 
the hemagglutination of the turkey erythrocytes. Antigenic 
properties were determined for 25 representative novel iso-
lates. Selection was based upon available HA titer of virus 
stocks and availability of at least two independent replicate 
experiments, measuring HI titers for all available ferret sera.
Analysis of antigenic properties was conducted using 
antigenic cartography methods as described previously [40, 
41]. Briefly, the HI titers are converted to a distance matrix 
in which the distance between one antigen and one antise-
rum corresponds to the difference between the  log2 value 
of the maximum observed titer to the antiserum from any 
 Virus Genes
1 3
2.1.3.2a 2.1.3.2b
2.1.3.2
2.1.3.1
2.1.3.3
2.1.3
2.1.2
2.1.1
2.2.1.1
2.2.1
2.2
2.2.2.1
2.5
2.4
2.3.4
2.3.4.2
2.3.4.3
2.3.4.1
2.3.3
2.3.2.1c
2.3.2.1a
2.3.2.1
2.3.2
2.3.1
1.1.2
1.1.1 1.1
1
8
9
6
5
7.2
7
4
300
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Fig. 1  Maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree of HA sequences of 
the newly sampled human HPAI H5N1 viruses. New virus isolates 
are indicated with encircled tips and colored by their respective year 
of sample collection. WHO reference strains are used to define the H5 
nomenclature system [34, 35]
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antigen and the titer of the antigen to the antiserum. This 
distance matrix is used as input for multidimensional scaling 
algorithms, which arrange the antiserum and antigen points 
in space to best satisfy the target distances specified by the 
HI data by minimizing the error. Therefore, the distances 
between the points in an antigenic map represent antigenic 
distance as measured by the HI assay, in which the distances 
between antigens (virus isolates) and antisera are inversely 
related to the  log2 HI titer. Although only distances between 
antigens and antisera are measured in the HI assay, anti-
genic maps allow the indirect measure of antigenic distances 
between two viruses.
Result
Epidemiological characteristic of confirmed cases
During the course of this study between 2008 and 2015, 
over 8000 poultry outbreaks of HPAI H5N1 viruses were 
reported [42] and 82 cases of laboratory-confirmed human 
HPAI H5N1 virus infection were collected. Of these 82 
cases, we successfully cultured 35 virus isolates for genetic 
and antigenic characterization. Table 1 shows a summary of 
the epidemiological and other data of these 35 cases. Among 
the 35 patients, the median age was 21 (range 2–40), 14 
(60%) were male, and 21 (40%) were female, and 18 (51%) 
received Oseltamivir treatment. Specimens were collected at 
median 8 days post onset of symptoms (range 0–17). There 
were a total of 6 specimens collected in 2008, 6 specimens 
in 2009, 5 specimens in 2010, 5 specimens in 2011, 5 speci-
mens in 2012, 5 specimens in 2013, 2 specimens in 2014 and 
2 specimens in 2015. These samples were collected from 
regions with high incidence of poultry H5N1 outbreaks [16, 
21], including West Java (31%), followed by Jakarta (26%) 
and the Banten province (14%).
Phylogenetic analyses show close relationship 
between human and avian HPAI H5N1 viruses
A ML phylogenetic tree based on hemagglutinin (HA) 
sequences was constructed to infer the evolutionary relation-
ships between the newly isolated viruses and HPAI H5N1 
viruses circulating globally (see “Materials and methods”). 
The ML tree of the HA gene showed that all novel viruses 
belonged to the monophyletic lineage of clade 2.1.3.x 
viruses known to have circulated in Indonesia between 2008 
and 2015, including clade 2.1.3.2 (10 viruses), 2.1.3.2a. (8 
viruses), 2.1.3.2b (16 viruses), and 2.1.3.3 (1 virus) (Fig. 1).
To further elucidate  the phylogenetic relationships 
between the novel H5N1 viruses and those collected from 
Indonesia previously, ML phylogenetic  trees were con-
structed for each individual influenza virus gene segment 
(Fig. S1). The phylogenetic groupings of individual gene 
segments were largely similar to the clade nomenclature 
assigned to the HA gene segment for most of the novel 
viruses. Some of the novel viruses are reassortants derived 
from gene segments attributed to different subclades of 
Indonesian H5N1 viruses. The NS, NP, MP, NA, PB2 
genes of A/Indonesia/NIHRD14122/2014 and A/Indone-
sia/NIHRD13157/2013, both of which HA genes belonged 
Table 1  Overview of demographic and clinical characteristics of 
H5N1-infected patients January 2008–December 2015 included in 
this study
Median age (range) 21 (2–40)
Sex (proportion)
 Male 14 (40%)
 Female 21 (60%)
Year of infection (CFR)
 2008 6 (33%)
 2009 6 (100%)
 2010 5 (16%)
 2011 5 (20%)
 2012 5 (100%)
 2013 3 (100%)
 2014 2 (100%)
 2015 2 (100%)
Location of origin
 West Sumatra, Indonesia 1 (3%)
 Riau, Indonesia 1 (3%)
 Bengkulu, Indonesia 1 (3%)
 Banten, Indonesia 5 (14%)
 Jakarta, Indonesia 9 (26%)
 West Java, Indonesia 11 (31%)
 Central Java, Indonesia 3 (9%)
 Jogjakarta, Indonesia 1 (3%)
 East Java, Indonesia 1 (3%)
 Bali, Indonesia 2 (6%)
Clinical outcome
 Survival 4 (11%)
 Death 31 (89%)
Antiviral treatment
 Yes 18 (51%)
 No 17 (49%)
Median days since symptom onset (range) 8 (0–17)
Median Ct value (range) 28 (13–38)
Type of specimens
 Upper respiratory track
  Nasal swab 5
  Throat swab 17
 Lower respiratory tract
  Bronchial washes 6
  Tracheal aspirates 3
  Pleural fluid 4
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to clade 2.1.3.2a, were found in the monophyletic lineage 
of clade 2.1.3.2b viruses in the respective gene phylogenies. 
Additionally, A/Indonesia/NIHRD7781/2008 (HA-2.1.3.3) 
had PB1, NP, NA and MP gene segments found in viruses 
belonging to clade 2.1.3.2 (Fig. S2). There were also no 
clear distinct phylogenetic groupings between human and 
avian viruses in any of the gene segment analyzed, indicat-
ing that viruses infecting both host types in Indonesia were 
genetically similar (Fig. S1D).
Residue and molecular analyses show limited 
presence of known human adaptive markers
Next, we compared the amino acid substitutions found in 
these newly isolated viruses against molecular markers 
known to alter viral phenotypes such as virulence, drug 
resistance and human host adaptation (Table S1) [43–47].
Hemagglutinin
The HA protein can affect the virulence and host range of 
HPAI H5N1 viruses due to (1) the presence of a multibasic 
cleavage site, as well as changes to (2) host cell receptor 
specificity, (3) N-linked glycosylation patterns and (4) HA 
stability.
The pathogenicity of avian influenza viruses is deter-
mined by the cleavability of the HA glycoprotein. The pres-
ence of multiple basic amino acid residues at the cleavage 
site of HA allows the glycoprotein to be cleaved into mature 
subunits HA1 and HA2 by furin-like proteases, which are 
ubiquitously expressed. To the contrary, HA containing a 
single basic residue are cleaved by trypsin-like proteases, 
predominantly expressed in the respiratory and intestinal 
tract of birds and the respiratory tract of humans. All of the 
new isolates analyzed in this study are highly pathogenic 
avian influenza viruses that encode a multibasic HA cleav-
age site [48, 49]. The cleavage site motif PQRESRRKKR↓G 
was found in 30 of the 35 newly isolated viruses while other 
variations (i.e., PQREGRRKKR↓G, PQRESKRKKR↓G, 
PQRESRRRKR↓G and PQRESRRKRR↓G) were observed 
in the remaining isolates.
Another key feature of HA related to both virulence and 
human adaptation is the receptor specificity. Conserved 
residues within the receptor binding site (RBS) of HA are 
required for binding to sialic acid receptors (SIA), while 
several other residues in domains surrounding the RBS are 
key determinants of receptor specificity. Residues in these 
domains, the 130-loop, 190-helix and the 220-loop, deter-
mine the specificity for either the avian-type receptor or 
human-type receptor, α2-3-linked SIA or α2-6-linked SIA, 
respectively. Several key residues within these domains have 
been identified at positions including 186, 190, 193, 224, 
226 and 228 (H3 numbering). High conservation of amino 
acid sequences was found at the receptor binding site (RBS). 
All isolates possessed a conserved residue at position N186, 
E190, N224, Q226 and G228, the most apparent residues 
involved in receptor binding specificity (as reviewed in 
[50]), indicating preferential binding of the viruses to avian 
like α2-3-linked SIA [51]. Interestingly, polymorphism was 
observed at position 193 for which a methionine or isoleu-
cine was observed, instead of the more common arginine or 
lysine. However, the exact role in receptor specificity for this 
residue needs to be determined [52, 53].
N-linked glycosylation of the influenza virus HA pro-
tein plays important roles in protein folding and modulates 
virus pathogenicity and evasion of neutralizing antibodies 
[54, 55]. In addition, glycans within the vicinity of the RBS 
region may alter receptor binding affinity and/or specificity. 
Like other clade 2.1 viruses, the H5N1 viruses from Indo-
nesia contain seven potential N-linked glycosylation sites. 
N-linked glycosylation at positions 14, 15, 27, 290 and 488 
are highly conserved among many HA subtypes [56]. In 
addition, H5N1 viruses can contain N-linked glycosylation 
sites at positions 158 and 169. The absence of glycosyla-
tion site 158 was linked to human receptor specificity and 
affinity, and aerosol transmission in ferrets, an animal model 
representative for aerosol transmission between humans 
[57, 58]. However, no substitution (i.e., N158X or T160X) 
removing this glycosylation site was observed in the new 
Indonesian samples.
Besides changes to receptor specificity and glycosylation 
patterns, the protein stability of HA is also important for 
human host adaptation, transmission and possibly virulence 
[46]. Nonetheless, we did not find in any of the 35 virus iso-
lates any HA substitutions (i.e., H103Y, T315I [57, 58] and 
Y351H, H352Q, an K387I (H3 numbering) [59, 60] that are 
known to increase replication and virulence of avian influ-
enza virus H5N1 or H7N9 in mammalian animal models by 
mediating HA protein stability. However, it is expected that 
other positions and substitutions within the HA trimer could 
affect stability and therefore be involved in human adap-
tation and transmissibility of H5N1 viruses, which would 
require further research to identify.
Neuraminidase
All of the novel HPAI H5N1 isolates were found to contain 
the deletion of amino acids between positions 49 and 68 in 
the stalk region of its NA glycoprotein. This shorter stalk 
length of NA was previously linked to increase virulence of 
H5N1 viruses in mammals [61–63].
Furthermore, the neuraminidase (NA) protein serves as 
a target for NA inhibitors (NAI) such as oseltamivir, zan-
amivir, peramivir and laninamivir, which block the NA 
enzyme active site to limit influenza virus egress. Eighteen 
of 35 patients were treated with oseltamivir in our study. 
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However, none of the newly isolated viruses encoded known 
NAI resistance mutations (i.e., V116A, I117V, E119V, 
G136K, V149A, R156K, D198N, S246N, H275Y, R293K, 
N295S (N1 numbering)) [64]. This corresponds with our 
earlier study showing that acquisition of NAI resistance is 
extremely rare in H5N1-infected individuals in Indonesia, 
be it before or during treatment [11]. Of note, Q136H was 
observed in 14 of the 35 isolates. Although Q136L is associ-
ated with reduced sensitivity to zanamivir and oseltamivir, 
Q136H had no effect on sensitivity to NAI when tested in 
H1N1pdm2009 or H3N2 [65].
M2
We previously showed that substitutions related to amanta-
dine resistance are common in H5N1 viruses in Indonesia 
[11] even though amantadine treatment is not administered 
anymore. The prevalence of amantadine resistance-related 
substitutions increased over time from 37.5% in 2005, to 
95% in 2009 and 100% during subsequent years [11]. Vari-
ous amantadine resistance substitutions in the M2 protein 
were also found in all 35 isolates, including V27A (34 
viruses), V27T (1 virus), S31G (1 virus), and S31N (5 
viruses). Interestingly, isolates in this study collected in 
more recent years often encode resistance mutations in both 
positions 27 and 31. These results indicate that Indonesian 
H5N1 viruses are sensitive to NA inhibitors but resistant to 
M2 inhibitor, despite the absence of amantadine treatment 
[11].
Polymerase complex
Besides receptor specificity, polymerase activity is known 
to be a hallmark for host adaptation and virulence. The 
polymerase complex is a heterotrimer that consists of the 
PB2, PB1 and PA subunits. The PB2 protein is an important 
determinant of virulence and host range. PB2 substitutions 
such as E627K and D701N [12] can dramatically increase 
polymerase activity of avian influenza viruses in mammalian 
cells. In particular, PB2-E627K is a key molecular determi-
nant of host range [66] and a virulence factor during human 
infection with HPAI H5N1 [67].
Both PB2-E627K (5 of 35 viruses) and PB2-D701N (1 
virus) substitutions were observed in a limited number of 
the novel viruses presented in this study. This is in strong 
contrast with human H5N1 viruses collected in other geo-
graphic regions where PB2-E627K substitution is common 
[68]. We also checked if there are other known substitutions 
found in the polymerase complex and nucleoprotein that 
enhance polymerase activity of avian influenza viruses in 
human cells reported in previous studies [69]. While there 
are some genetic variations present in some of these posi-
tions, there were no obvious markers of human adaptation 
or virulence that could be linked to the high case fatality rate 
of H5N1 infections in humans in Indonesia.
Immune regulatory proteins NS1 and PB1‑F2
Both PB1-F2 and NS1 have immune regulatory roles for 
influenza virus. The full-length PB1-F2 protein (90 aa) 
inhibits type I interferon response mediated by the mito-
chondrial antiviral signaling protein [70, 71]. However, the 
open reading frame (ORF) of the auxiliary protein which 
occurs in the second ORF of the PB1 gene segment can 
be truncated or lost [70, 72]. All of the Indonesian H5N1 
viruses were found to encode the full-length PB1-F2 pro-
tein. Furthermore, the N66S substitution in PB1-F2 known 
to increase virulence [70] was not found in any of the novel 
viruses.
On the other hand, the four-amino-acid sequence motif 
(ESEV) at the carboxyl terminus of NS1 facilitates the non-
structural protein to bind to cellular PDZ-containing proteins 
that are involved in host cellular signaling pathways [73]. 
The ESEV motif was found in all of the new Indonesian 
isolates.
NS1 mutations such as P42S, D87E, L98F and I101M 
were also found to modulate the virulence of H5N1 viruses 
[73]. Additionally, substitutions in NS1 (N200S, G205R) as 
well as NS2 (T47A, M51I) proteins may result in decreased 
antiviral responses in the host [74]. However, none of these 
substitutions were found in the 35 H5N1 viruses.
Antigenic analyses show two antigenically distinct 
virus populations which co‑circulate
Besides the presence of virulence and human adaptive mark-
ers, it is important to monitor and understand the antigenic 
properties of circulating influenza viruses. Vaccination is a 
primary measure to control or prevent H5N1 outbreaks in 
poultry and could be used to protect humans from H5N1 
infections, should these viruses become pandemic. Influenza 
viruses can easily escape from available vaccines by sub-
stitutions in the major antigenic sites on the globular head 
domain of HA [75]. Here we investigated the antigenic prop-
erties of these human HPAI H5N1 viruses.
To characterize the antigenic diversity of Indonesian 
human influenza H5N1 viruses by HI test, we selected 
a panel of ferret antisera able to detect antigenic varia-
tion between representative viruses [40]. We included 
ferret antisera against clade 2.1.3.1 (A/Chicken/South 
Sulawesi/157/2011), different clade 2.1.3.2 viruses (A/Indo-
nesia/5/2005, A/Chicken/Central Java/51/2009, A/Chicken/
East Java/121/2010, A/Chicken/West Java/30/2007 and A/
Chicken/West Java/119/2010) and against clade 2.1.3.3 
(A/Chicken/North Sumatra/72/2010). We determined the 
antigenic properties of 25 isolates analyzed in HI assays 
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using this panel of ferret antisera. Antigenic cartography 
was used to visualize the antigenic relatedness of the HPAI 
H5N1 isolates in a 2D space (Fig. 2). The antigenic map 
showed that the human HPAI H5N1 viruses from Indo-
nesia clustered into two antigenic groups. The first group 
of viruses clustered around two representative antisera of 
clade 2.1.3.2 (A/Chicken/East Java/121/2010, A/Chicken/
West Java/119/2010) and contained most of the Indone-
sian H5N1 viruses (21 of 25 included here) of genetically 
clade 2.1.3.2, 2.1.3.2a and 2.1.3.2b. Although these viruses 
do cluster around the A/Chicken/East Java/121/2010 sera, 
quite some antigenic differences are apparent within this 
group. The second group (4 of 25) was antigenically closer 
to representative antisera of clade 2.1.3.1 (A/Chicken/South 
Sulawesi/157/2011), clade 2.1.3.2 (A/Indonesia/5/2005, A/
Chicken/Central Java/51/2009), clade 2.1.3.3 (A/Indone-
sia/North Sumatra/72/2010). This finding is similar with 
a previous study, describing different antigenic clusters 
within avian H5N1 viruses in Indonesia isolated from poul-
try [40]. This study identified a small number of residues 
immediately adjacent to the RBS within the antigenic sites 
in the globular head domain of HA, which are primarily 
responsible for antigenic changes. We investigated genetic 
diversity at these positions. Amino acid differences were 
identified at these six antigenically important positions 
located near the receptor binding sites [40]: 129, 133, 151, 
183, 185 and 189 (H5 numbering as there is no equivalent 
for position 129 in H3N2 viruses; Table 2). All viruses anti-
genically clustering into the first antigenic group possessed 
residues S129, S133, I151, N183, A185 and M189, except 
for isolates 11,046 and 12,452 that contained T183 and I189, 
respectively. The N183T substitution does not seem to have 
an antigenic effect, although the M189I could have a small 
antigenic effect as indicated by the placement on the outside 
of the cluster. The virus isolates of cluster 2 contained resi-
dues S129, S133, I151, D183, A185 and R189, typical for A/
Indonesia/5/2005 antigenic-like viruses. The study by Koel 
et al. has previously shown that substitutions D183N and 
R189M are indeed responsible for the antigenic differences 
between these two clusters. Isolate 10,364 contained A133; 
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2008
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2014
Fig. 2  Antigenic map of Indonesia human H5N1 viruses. Circles and 
open squares indicate the positions of viruses and antisera, respec-
tively. Both axes represent antigenic distance: one square on the anti-
genic map represents a distance of one antigenic unit, corresponding 
to a twofold difference in the HI assay. The antigenic map was gen-
erated using antigenic cartography, a method that uses multidimen-
sional scaling algorithms to place virus and antiserum points in a 2D 
space such that their relative position in the map reflects the HI titers 
with minimal error. The distance between a virus-and-antiserum pair 
is inversely related to the HI titer of the virus to that antiserum. The 
color coding of the human HPAI H5N1 isolates is based on their year 
of isolation as depicted in Fig. 1. Virus isolate names and antisera are 
abbreviated to isolate number/year
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however, this substitution does not seem to have major anti-
genic effects as this isolate clusters with other viruses. It 
was previously shown that a combination of substitutions 
at position 133 and 185 is necessary to result in antigenic 
changes [40].
These data showed that viruses belonging to two distinct 
antigenic groups infected humans in Indonesia. Interest-
ingly, the presence of viruses from different years of isola-
tion in both clusters (as indicated by the color coding of 
the viruses in Fig. 2) indicates that these different antigenic 
variants were co-circulating. Full protection in humans 
would therefore have likely required a multivalent vaccine, 
including at least A/Indonesia/5/2005- and A/chicken/East 
Java/121/2010-like viruses, which are currently under devel-
opment or approved for human and/or poultry use [17, 76].
Discussion
Indonesia has suffered numerous HPAI H5N1 virus out-
breaks in poultry farms, live bird markets and backyard 
poultry, which have resulted in 200 reported human cases 
with a case fatality rate of over 80%. This high case fatal-
ity rate is in sharp contrast with lower case fatality rates in 
Table 2  HA protein sequence 
diversity of important antigenic 
sites
1 Based on results from antigenic analyses as represented in Fig. 2
2 Antigenic site residues indicated based on Koel et al. [40]
Isolate name Antigenic  group1 Clade 1292 133 151 183 185 189
1 A/Indonesia/NIHRD7393/2008 2 2.1.3.2 S S I D A R
2 A/Indonesia/NIHRD7503/2008 Unknown 2.1.3.2 S S I N A M
3 A/Indonesia/NIHRD7781/2008 2 2.1.3.3 S S I D A R
4 A/Indonesia/NIHRD7802/2008 1 2.1.3.2 S S I N A M
5 A/Indonesia/NIHRD7988/2008 Unknown 2.1.3.2 S S I D A R
6 A/Indonesia/NIHRD8987/2008 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
7 A/Indonesia/NIHRD9152/2009 Unknown 2.1.3.2 S S I N A R
8 A/Indonesia/NIHRD9158/2009 Unknown 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
9 A/Indonesia/NIHRD9160/2009 1 2.1.3.2a S S I N A M
10 A/Indonesia/NIHRD9340/2009 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
11 A/Indonesia/NIHRD9653/2009 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
12 A/Indonesia/NIHRD9665/2009 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
13 A/Indonesia/NIHRD10364/2010 2 2.1.3.2 S A I D A R
14 A/Indonesia/NIHRD10459/2010 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
15 A/Indonesia/NIHRD10529/2010 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
16 A/Indonesia/NIHRD10612/2010 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
17 A/Indonesia/NIHRD10623/2010 Unknown 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
18 A/Indonesia/NIHRD10728/2010 Unknown 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
19 A/Indonesia/NIHRD11046/2011 1 2.1.3.2b S S I T A M
20 A/Indonesia/NIHRD11073/2011 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
21 A/Indonesia/NIHRD11198/2011 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
22 A/Indonesia/NIHRD11454/2011 2 2.1.3.2 S S I D A R
23 A/Indonesia/NIHRD11771/2011 Unknown 2.1.3.2a S S I N A M
24 A/Indonesia/NIHRD12078/2012 1 2.1.3.2a S S I N A M
25 A/Indonesia/NIHRD12130/2012 1 2.1.3.2a S S I N A M
26 A/Indonesia/NIHRD12162/2012 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
27 A/Indonesia/NIHRD12377/2012 Unknown 2.1.3.2a S S I N A M
28 A/Indonesia/NIHRD12452/2012 1 2.1.3.2a S S I N A I
29 A/Indonesia/NIHRD13157/2013 1 2.1.3.2a S S I N A M
30 A/Indonesia/NIHRD13233/2013 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
31 A/Indonesia/NIHRD13269/2013 1 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
32 A/Indonesia/NIHRD14122/2014 1 2.1.3.2a S S I N A M
33 A/Indonesia/NIHRD14157/2014 Unknown 2.1.3.2b S S I N A M
34 A/Indonesia/NIHRD15023/2015 Unknown 2.1.3.2b S S I N I M
35 A/Indonesia/NIHRD15028/2015 Unknown 2.1.3.2b S S I N I M
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countries affected by other genetic clades of HPAI H5N1 
viruses. Despite the large number of cases, limited genetic 
and antigenic information is available for HPAI H5N1 iso-
lates from human cases in Indonesia. Here we present 35 
HPAI H5N1 virus isolates collected from infected humans 
in Indonesia as part of outbreak investigations between 2008 
and 2015. These novel HPAI H5N1 viruses were genetically 
typed as clade 2.1.x viruses (i.e., 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3) using 
hemagglutinin sequences in previous analyses [34]. Clade 
2.1.1 viruses were mostly identified from poultry outbreaks 
between 2003 and 2004, while the viruses from clade 2.1.2 
and 2.1.3 circulated at the beginning of 2004 in birds and 
were also isolated from humans [77]. As frequency of clade 
2.1.2 viruses identified in Indonesia started to decline in 
2005, with none detected after 2008 [78], clade 2.1.3 viruses 
continued to circulate. Phylogenetic analyses of the HA gene 
showed that all of the new 35 isolates cluster with other 
2.1.3.x viruses, similar to earlier published human and avian 
sequences from Indonesia. These new isolates are closely 
related to previously sequenced avian HPAI H5N1 viruses 
circulating in Indonesia.
We recently showed that the high case fatality rate of 
human Indonesian H5N1 cases correlated with viral load 
prior to treatment and increased from 65% in 2005 to 100% 
since 2012 [11]. We found that this high case fatality rate 
coincided with the high prevalence of amantadine resist-
ance-conferring M2 substitutions; however, no mechanistic 
explanation for the role of such substitutions in virulence of 
HPAI H5N1 is known yet. The aforementioned study did 
not include any further sequencing data looking into spe-
cific virulence and human adaptive markers. Our analyses 
of the full genomic sequences for the 35 isolates did not 
indicate any potential genetic changes that might explain the 
increase in case fatality rate and virulence over time. We did 
not find any known genetic markers associated with human 
adaptation or virulence in the HA or polymerase complex 
genes. There were no changes in the RBS region of HA that 
was indicative of a switch towards the human-type receptor. 
Although some genetic diversity was observed in the poly-
merase genes, well-known substitutions such as PB2-E627K 
and PB2-D701N, which are often selected upon infection of 
humans and affects the virulence of avian influenza viruses 
such as H5N1 [12, 66, 67, 79], were not commonly found 
in the new samples. However, there could also be other cur-
rently unknown adaptive substitutions present in the new 
human samples. Confirmatory investigations into the effects 
of these substitutions on the activity of the polymerase com-
plexes of both human and avian HPAI H5N1 viruses should 
be done in future studies.
Further sampling and research, involving the collection of 
more full genome sequences from avian and human viruses 
as well as both in vitro and in vivo characterization of virus 
replication and pathogenicity, are warranted to determine 
if Indonesian HPAI H5N1 viruses are indeed more viru-
lent than H5N1 viruses of other genetic clades circulating 
in other geographic areas. This should also address whether 
there is a specific selection for more virulent viruses in 
humans only or whether Indonesia HPAI A/H5N1 viruses 
are more virulent in general, also in poultry in Indonesia, 
resulting in the consequence that zoonotic events happen 
with more virulent viruses, resulting in higher case fatality 
rates. Further characterization of virus isolates from differ-
ent periods of time will have to show if more recent viruses 
are indeed more virulent and whether this could be contrib-
uted to specific molecular markers.
A possible reason why human H5N1 cases have declined 
is the implementation of large-scale vaccination of poul-
try against H5N1. Most countries affected by H5N1 virus 
outbreaks, including Indonesia, have implemented poultry 
vaccination as a key strategy for the control of H5N1 infec-
tions. Currently, the H5N1 vaccine for poultry in Indonesia 
is an inactivated bivalent vaccine containing H5N1 viruses 
belonging to clades 2.3.2 and 2.1.3. As for the selection 
of human seasonal vaccine strains, antigenic analyses are 
required to understand and predict vaccine effectiveness. 
From the current study, antigenic analyses of human H5N1 
viruses from 2008 till 2015 identified two antigenic groups 
of human clade 2.1.3 viruses that co-circulate in Indonesia. 
Based on a previous study by Koel et al., the antigenic differ-
ences could be explained by alternative amino acids present 
at several key residues at the rim of the receptor binding site.
No evidence of antigenic change over time was observed 
or association with geographical location. Therefore, a com-
bination of two of the current available pre-pandemic human 
H5N1 vaccines, A/Indonesia/5/20 05 and A/Indonesia/
NIHRD11771/2011, would have been required to optimize 
protection against the two different antigenic groups.
In summary, we performed genetic and antigenic analyses 
of H5N1 influenza viruses isolated from humans between 
2008 and 2015. We observed low levels of genetic diversity 
and only sporadically prevalence of known substitutions 
associated with human adaptation and virulence (e.g., PB2-
627K). However, the analysis only captured the majority 
variants and did not include the presence of minority vari-
ants present during infection. Additionally, we have lim-
ited our genetic analyses to known substitutions only. To 
ascertain and better understand the high mortality associ-
ated with human HPAI H5N1 virus infections in Indonesia, 
it is essential to perform more in-depth analysis of genetic 
diversity during human infections with HPAI H5N1 virus 
and to functionally characterize the observed substitutions. 
Furthermore, our data showed that two antigenic groups 
co-circulated in Indonesia, with no evidence of antigenic 
change over time. A combination of available pre-pandemic 
vaccines was required to be protective against circulating 
viruses of study period.
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